property that had never been taxed. Utilizing this taxing power, states are eager to reach the royalty income accumulated by companies holding intellectual property, but in taxing that income, states may encounter a potential constitutional stumbling block.
How does intellectual property become part of a tax avoidance scheme? What is an IP holding company? What are the tax and nontax reasons that facilitate the creation of this scheme? What are the constitutional challenges states may face in their efforts to tax royalty income? What are their alternatives?
What are the constitutional challenges states may face in their efforts to tax royalty income? What are their alternatives?
This report will address these questions and argue that the IP holding company scheme is a complex tax avoidance program requiring states to devise an approach to taxation that reflects an understanding of intellectual property rights and of the interests of intellectual property rights holders. In and of itself, a scheme that results in tax avoidance is not illegal. There are considerable business reasons behind the creation of an IP holding company for a major corporation's intellectual property assets. Part I discusses the transformation of intellectual property into valuable corporate assets.
Part II identifies and analyzes the IP holding company scheme. Notable examples illustrate the widespread use of this scheme by major U.S. corporations.
Part III focuses on the constitutional reach of state taxing power to royalty income received by out-of-state holding companies in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota. 6 Part IV discusses how states attempted to evade constitutional requirements in their eagerness to tax the royalty income of out-of-state holding companies. This section analyzes the business situs approach to intellectual property rights as employed by states to justify their fulfillment of the constitutional requirements post-Quill. This section critiques the business situs approach by providing examples of how the approach reaches beyond constitutional limits.
Part V advocates balancing the interests of states and the holders of intellectual property. This section highlights some fundamental aspects of intellectual property rights that may assist states in their efforts to reach royalty income received by out-of-state holding companies that license intellectual property rights for use within states. This section also provides alternative approaches states may consider that pose less risk of constitutional challenges.
This article concludes that as long as intellectual property assets are valuable corporate assets and holders of intellectual property continue to seek ways to maximize their return on such assets, uncertainties regarding states' power to tax an IP holding company's income reflect a need for guidance from Congress and a need for uniformity of state tax treatments. Regardless of these uncertainties, the potential migration of intellectual property assets offshore poses yet another problem.
II. The Rise of Intellectual Property Assets
Rapid change in science and technology coupled with expansion of legal protection 7 has created a new type of valuable intangible corporate asset. 8 That asset is intellectual property, which often includes patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and trademarks. 9 Although the existence of various forms of intellectual property can be traced to antiquity, 10 the 6 504 U. S. 298 (1992) . 7 The expansion of legal protection for intangible property is evidenced by the recognition of patent protection in the biotech, computer software, and Internet industries. Rep. 30, 31 (2004) (''[I] ntellectual property is in a constant state of boundless growth. It can arise at any time by virtue of almost any new creation or invention from any of the billions of minds on the planet engaged in multitudinous endeavors''); Richard G. Mason and Beth M. Polebaum, ''Buying Intellectual Property From Troubled Companies, '' 779 PLI/PAT 365, 373 (2004) (''In today's economy, a company's intellectual property may be among its most valuable assets''). 9 See Robert P. Merges, ''A New Dynamism in the Public Domain,'' 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 183, 200 (2004) (noting ''widespread consensus that intellectual property rights have become increasingly valuable since the 1970s''); Sherry Lynn Murphy, ''Unlimited Congressional Power Under the Copyright Clause in Article I of the Constitution: Eldred v. Ashcroft,'' 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 525, 531-533 (2004) (providing brief discussion of types of intellectual property). 10 The history of various forms of intellectual property is rich. Trade secrets and legal protection against misappropriation of trade secrets have been traced to the Roman Empire. A. Arthur Schiller, ''Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, '' 30 Colum. L. Rev. 837, 838-39 (1930) (arguing that action available in response to third party enticing slave-employee to disclose business secrets demonstrates that Roman law protected intellectual property). The earliest mention of a patent protection system is in Aristotle's The Politics. See Aristotle, The Politics 36-39 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (discussing law of Hippodamus ''that those who discovered anything for the good of the state should be honoured''). Copyright protection emerged from the introduction of the printing press in England. See Shubha Ghosh, ''Deprivatizing Copyright,'' 54 Case impact of intellectual property on the economy, workplace, 11 culture, society, and daily life is a more recent phenomenon. 12 The globalization of commerce has facilitated the movement of goods, including patented, copyrighted, and trademarked goods, to all corners of the world. 13 Indeed, the monetary value of copyrighted goods exported from the United States to other countries has led all other exported goods. 14 Moreover, the emergence of digital technology and the Internet has transformed the protection and dissemination of copyrighted materials. 15 Commercial success based on invention and innovation has exploded in recent years. 16 Perceiving patents as highly valuable assets, corporations and individual inventors actively seek them -so actively that the number granted by the U.S. Patent Office has increased approximately threefold in the last 20 years. 17 Similarly, during fiscal 2003 alone, the U.S. Copyright Office registered 534,122 copyrightable works. 18 In short, intellectual property today has become so enormously important 19 that the legal protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights W. Res. L. Rev. 387, 429 (2003) (detailing connection between printing press technology and emergence of copyright protection). The use of trademarks in commerce is also traced to antiquity. See generally Sidney A. Diamond, ''The Historical Development of Trademarks, '' 65 Trademark Rep. 265 (1975) (surveying history of trademark); F.D. Prager, ''The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property,'' 34 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y. 106 (1952) (discussing early history of intellectual property in developed nations). 'l L. 1, 27-52 (2004) (analyzing growth and impact of intellectual property in areas of international concern, such as biodiversity, plant genetic resources, public health, and human rights); Peter K. Yu, ''The Escalating Copyright Wars, '' 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 907, 909 (2004) (concluding that new digital copyright law and its challenges have become ''a matter of public significance, affecting all of us in our daily lives''). 13 See Robert Bejesky, ''Investing in the Dragon: Managing the Patent Versus Trade Secret Protection Decision for the Multinational Corporation in China, '' 11 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 437, 438 n.6 (2004) (noting the important role of intellectual property protection in transnational exports and economic development); cf. Ann Bartow, ''Likelihood of Confusion, '' 41 San Diego L. Rev. 721, 733-737 (2004) (explaining the complexity of source of trademarked goods in commerce, as such goods are manufactured by companies while trademarks associated with such goods convey different sources).
14 See Colin Darch, ''Digital Divide or Unequal Exchange? How the Northern Intellectual Property Rights Regime Threatens the South, '' 32 Int'l. J. Legal Info. 488, 489 (2004) (asserting that ''the value of the export to the rest of the world of U.S. copyright products . . . exceeded the total for clothes, chemicals, cars, computers and airplanes combined''). 15 See Gerard N. Magliocca, ''From Ashes to Fire: Trademark and Copyright in Transition,'' 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1009 , 1044 -1049 (2004 Bus. L.J. 187, 192-197 (2002) '' 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2099 , 2118 (2000 (reporting a dramatic increase of 39.1 percent in a number of patent applications filed between 1993 and 1998 and a 45.4 percent increase in number of patents issued between 1995 and 1998).
Indeed, intellectual property has become so significant that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has admitted: These valuable products, collectively known as ''Intellectual Property'' (IP), are the primary fuel of the U.S. economic engine. Currently, the U.S. leads the world in the creation and export of IP and IP-related products. The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition recently reported that the combined U.S. copyright industries and derivative businesses account for more than $433 billion, or 5.68 percent, of the U.S. Gross National Product, which is more than any other single manufacturing sector. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that between 1977 and 1996 the growth in the IP segment of the economy was nearly twice that of the U.S. economy as a whole. It is also estimated that the software industry alone will employ more than one million people in the U. Not surprisingly, major companies today accumulate and possess large intellectual property portfolios. 22 For the last 10 years, IBM has led all companies in the number of patents received each year, including 3,411 patents issued in 2001. 23 Canon, Sony, and General Electric each received more than 1,000 issued patents during 2001. 24 Companies with large copyright holdings in the publishing and entertainment areas enjoy the high export value of their copyrighted goods, as evidenced by one reported estimate placing the total value of these U.S. exports as higher than $400 billion annually. 25 The Coca-Cola trademark alone is valued at more than $67 billion, while the Microsoft brand is valued at $61 billion, IBM at $54 billion, GE at $44 billion, and Intel at $33 billion in 2004. 26 III. The Scheme of Tax Avoidance: IP Holding Company As intellectual property becomes a more important corporate asset, many companies with large intellectual property portfolios search for ways to maximize revenues. A common way to expand market exposure is through the licensing of intellectual property assets for new fields of products and services in existing or new territories. 27 Income derived from licensing intellectual property assets is subject to federal and state taxation as ordinary income. 28 In recent years, companies have devised a scheme to minimize state taxation of royalty income. 29 Under such a scheme, a company with a large intellectual property portfolio forms a wholly owned subsidiary to hold its intellectual property assets. 30 The parent company selects a state jurisdiction that does not tax royalty income received from licensing intellectual property assets and then forms its sub- sidiary, the IP holding company, there. 31 The parent company transfers all of its intellectual property assets to the IP holding company in exchange for ownership of 80 percent or more of stock in the IP holding company. 32 Such a transfer and exchange is not a taxable event because no gains are recognized. The IP holding company then licenses the intellectual property assets back to the parent company 33 and in some instances to sister companies that need to use the intellectual property assets. 34 Those sister companies, which are also operating companies, conduct business in numerous or all states and are generally allowed to deduct, as business expenses, royalties paid to the IP holding company. 35 The IP holding company, on the other hand, receives royalties from the operating companies and does not have to pay state taxes on that royalty income in the jurisdiction where the IP holding company was formed. 36 The IP holding company then uses the royalties for loans to the operating companies and receives interest from those loans. 37 The IP holding company may then pay dividends to the parent company. 38 Examples of these tax avoidance schemes are everywhere. The Limited Stores Inc., an Ohio corporation, owns numerous retailing companies that operate stores throughout the United States. 39 The parent company has also created wholly owned IP holding companies in Delaware to hold well-known trademarks in the clothing industry, such as ''The Limited,'' ''Victoria's Secret,'' ''Express,'' ''Abercrombie & Fitch,'' ''Lane Bryant,'' and ''Lerner,'' which were all once owned by the parent company but exchanged for stock ownership in the subsidiaries. 40 The IP holding companies then licensed the trademarks to the related retail companies in exchange for royalty payments. 41 Corp. v. Comm'r, 765 N.E.2d 758, 765 (Mass. 2002) (denying the parent company's deduction of royalty payments to subsidiary because transfer and licenseback arrangement was a sham).
36
As Delaware corporations, IP holding companies enjoy significant legal and tax advantages as long as they confine ''their activities to holding, maintaining, and managing intangible assets.'' Sherwin-Williams Co., 778 N.E.2d at 509. Under Delaware law, ''royalties and other income earned by'' IP holding companies are ''exempt from State taxation. '' Id. (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, section 1902(b) (8) (1997 and Supp. 2004) ).
37
The operating companies will deduct the interest payment on such loans as ordinary expense. E.g., id. at 522-523 (allowing parent company to deduct interest payment on short-term loan of $7 million from subsidiary).
38
See Michael T. Fatale, ''State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical 'Physical Presence' Constitutional Standard, '' 54 Tax Law. 105, 135 (2000) (stating that transfer and licenseback scheme is ''fairly common tax avoidance technique''). 48 Intellectual property tax schemes are not limited to trademarks. Indeed, such schemes include patents and other intellectual property assets. For example, Gore Enterprise Holdings Inc. owns more than 300 patents related to the process and manufacture of Gore-Tex products. 49 The Gore parent company transferred all of its patents to Holdings in exchange for all of Holdings' stock. 50 The holding company and the parent company entered into a licensing arrangement for the patents. 51 Under the assignment and license-back arrangement, the holding company manages the patent portfolio, collects royalties from the use of the patents, and invests the proceeds in investment vehicles. 52 The holding company had not had any employees or office space for some years, and its activities were conducted by employees at the parent company. 53 The holding company later hired one paralegal, who monitored and administered the patent portfolio. 54 The holding company also retained outside attorneys to conduct patent prosecution work. 55 Over a three-year period, the holding company received about $120 million in royalty payments from the parent company. 56 The subsidiary filed no state income tax returns, but filed information returns with Delaware, the subsidiary's state of incorporation. 57 Not surprisingly, Delaware does not tax royalty payments. 58 Essentially, under the intellectual property tax scheme, companies with large intellectual property portfolios can legitimately avoid paying state taxes on income derived from royalties. 59 -2002 - -27171 or 2002 50 Id. at *1.
51
Id. at *1-*2.
52
Id.
53
Id. at *3.
54
Id. (stating that some patent prosecution work was performed by the parent company, which did not receive reimbursement).
55
56
Id. Id. Before the Quill decision, it was ''generally considered that the requirement of the Due Process Clause that an entity have certain minimum contacts with a taxing jurisdiction to support the imposition of a tax was not different from
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(Footnote continued on next page.) corporation with offices and warehouses in Illinois, California, and Georgia. 63 It had neither tangible property nor employees in North Dakota. 64 Quill engaged in the business of selling office equipment and supplies via mail-order catalogs. 65 It estimated that $1 million in sales were made annually to 3,000 customers residing in North Dakota. 66 Quill delivered merchandise to customers by mail or common carrier from out-of-state locations. 67 The state of North Dakota required Quill to collect a use tax 68 from North Dakota consumers who purchased Quill products via mail-order catalogs and to remit the collected tax to the state. 69 North Dakota essentially tried to tap into the remarkable growth of the mail-order business, which grew from a relatively inconsequential market niche to a ''goliath'' with annual sales that reached '''the staggering figure of $183.3 billion''' within a short period of 20 years, by imposing on out-of-state companies the obligation to collect a use tax on property purchased by in-state consumers and to remit that tax to the state. 70 The rationale for imposing the use tax was the economic benefit, legal infrastructure, support, and opportunities provided by the state to out-of-state companies that facilitate the demand for those companies' products and, consequently, the growth of such companies and their respective markets. 71 In the balance, the state believed there was a constitutionally sufficient nexus 72 to justify imposing the purely administrative duty of collecting and remitting the use tax. 73 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with much of North Dakota's reasoning but declined to overrule its own precedent on the constitutional limitations of the taxing power of states on out-of-state companies. 74 The Court reemphasized and clarified that state taxing statutes on out-of-state companies must satisfy both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 75 The Court uncoupled the two clauses and explained that each clause poses different and distinct limits on the states' taxing power. 76 A state may be consistent with the Due Process Clause and have the authority to tax a particular out-of-state company, but imposition of that tax may nonetheless stand in violation of the Commerce Clause. 77 Indeed, the Court explained in great detail that due process mainly concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity and that the constitutional inquiry often focuses on ''notice'' and ''fair warning'' as the touchstone of nexus analysis. 78 For tax purposes, the Due Process Clause requires some the substantial nexus component of the Commerce Clause standard.'' Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 204.
63
Quill, 504 U.S. at 302.
64
65
66
67
Id. Quill, 504 U.S. at 303 (quoting Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208-09 (N.D. 1991) The Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement, in contrast, focus on structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy. 81 For tax purposes, the analysis centers on whether a tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the state. 82 The fair apportionment and nondiscrimination inquiry prohibits taxes that pass an unfair share of the tax burden onto interstate commerce. 83 The substantial nexus and the relationship between the tax and the state-provided services inquiries seek to limit the reach of the state taxing authority, ensuring that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce. 84 Accordingly, the substantial nexus requirement is not similar to the due process minimum contacts requirement, which is a proxy for notice and fair warning, ''but [is] rather a means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.'' 85 A company may have the minimum contacts with a taxing state required by the Due Process Clause, yet lack the substantial nexus required by the Commerce Clause. 86 Since Quill neither owned property in North Dakota nor had employees in North Dakota, the Court reversed the state court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion on the substantial nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause. 87 The Quill decision sent a clear message to states that the Commerce Clause limits the taxing power of states regarding out-of-state companies. A taxing state must establish the physical presence of out-ofstate companies within its jurisdiction in order for a state's sales or use taxing statute to pass constitutional muster. The constitutional requirement as dictated by Quill has direct consequences for state revenue because a state's reach to outside sellers is no longer expansive. 88
B. Post-Quill Chaos for Intellectual Property
Because Quill directly limits state power to impose sales and use taxes on out-of-state companies, a major question in the post-Quill era is whether the physical presence requirement of the Commerce Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity. Thus, at the most general level, the due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an individual's connections with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the State's exercise of power over him. We have, therefore, often identified ''notice'' or ''fair warning'' as the analytic touchstone of due process nexus analysis. Id. at 312. The Court noted that due process jurisprudence has evolved in the preceding 25 years, primarily in the area of in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 307.
Due process jurisprudence, as now applied to state taxation on out-of-state sellers, suggests that such a seller or corporation ''clearly has fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. '' Id. at 308 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) ).
79
Id. (stating that solicitation through ''a deluge of catalogs'' alone met due process requirement for state use tax purpose because ''requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State'').
80
81
Id. at 312. Moreover, the Court said that as the Commerce Clause jurisprudence has evolved, ''no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce'' that causes direct burdens on interstate commerce. Id. at 309. Id. at 313-319. Specifically, the Court said: North Dakota's use tax illustrates well how a state tax might unduly burden interstate commerce. On its face, North Dakota law imposes a collection duty on every vendor who advertises in the State three times in a single year. Thus, absent the Bellas Hess rule, a publisher who included a subscription card in three issues of its magazine, a vendor whose radio advertisements were heard in North Dakota on three occasions, and a corporation whose telephone sales force made three calls into the State, all would be subject to the collection duty. What is more significant, similar obligations might be imposed by the Nation's 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions. Id. at 313 n.6. The Court explicitly rejected the finding of nexus based on Quill's contact with North Dakota:
In addition to its common-carrier contacts with the State, Quill also licensed software to some of its North Dakota clients. The State ''concedes that the existence in North Dakota of a few floppy diskettes to which Quill holds title seems a slender thread upon which to base nexus.'' We agree. Clause extends to state power to tax income received from out-of-state companies. 89 Some commentators asserted that the physical presence constitutional standard is a myth with respect to limiting state power to tax income received by out-of-state companies. 90 Further, the assertion suggests that Quill permits state taxation of such income ''by virtue of an intentional exploitation of the state's market without physical presence in the state. '' 91 A major question in the post-Quill era is whether the physical presence requirement of the Commerce Clause extends to state power to tax income received from out-of-state companies.
Others, however, interpreted Quill as dictating a bright-line approach not only for sales and use taxes, but also for state income taxation of out-ofstate companies, which requires physical presence for substantial nexus in order to satisfy the Commerce Clause mandate. 92 To read Quill otherwise would render an incongruity: Out-of-state companies would not have a sufficient nexus with the taxing state for sales and use tax purposes but would have a substantial nexus with the taxing state for income tax purposes. 93 As a result, a number of states tried taxing the income received by out-of-state IP holding companies that are separate entities, have no tangible assets, and hire no employees in the taxing state. 94 Meanwhile, other states have failed to reach IP holding companies for lack of physical presence in the taxing state, even though the IP holding companies license their intellectual property assets to affiliates or parent companies for use within that state. 95
V. Situs of Intellectual Property Inquiry
In desperate attempts to reach income generated by the licensing of intellectual property assets, states will flex their taxing power in order to subject out-of-state IP holding companies to state income taxation. These states circumvent Quill by adopting an approach centered on the belief that intellectual property has a business situs where the goods associated with those intellectual property rights are offered for sale at locales within the state. 96
A. Business Situs
Under the business situs theory, intangibles acquire situs for taxation purposes if they have become an integral part of local business. 97 Rev. 319, 347 (2003) and State Tax Notes, Feb. 2, 2004 , p. 341, 2004 STT 21-3, or Doc 2004 -1663 (noting that ''business situs'' was first used in a due process case where New York successfully attempted to tax a nonresident on the gain from sale of membership in New York Stock Exchange). 98 The business situs of intellectual property goods -whether trademarked, copyrighted, or patented -allows the taxing jurisdiction to have a substantial nexus with the out-ofstate company. 99 Thus, applying the business situs theory, a state can tax royalty income derived from the intellectual property rights used in connection with the sale of goods or services within the state, even though the holder of the intellectual property is incorporated, owns tangible property, or has employees conducting business in a different jurisdiction. 100 The extension of the business situs rule to IP holding companies appeared 20 years ago in an administrative decision, In re Addax Music Co. 101 In that case, the New York Department of Taxation and Finance ruled that petitioner Addax Music, a wholly owned subsidiary of Paramount Pictures that only held copyrights to musical compositions and received royalties through its membership in an intermediary, was subject to New York state income tax in the form of a franchise tax. 102 Addax Music was a California corporation and had no employees, and all of its accounting and administrative functions were performed by employees of Paramount Pictures in California. 103 Addax Music received its royalty payments via its membership in ASCAP, a nonprofit membership association of composers, lyricists, and music publishers. 104 ASCAP collected fees from nonexclusive blanket licenses and distributed them to its members. 105 The department asserted that although Addax Music was not based in New York, its copyrighted compositions nevertheless had a taxable situs there 106 because the copyrighted compositions were integrated in the local New York business through the licensing arrangements. 107 The department found that Addax Music, through ASCAP, monitored and licensed its music composition in New York. 108 Essentially, Addax Music obtained its royalty income through the copyrights used in the local New York business market. 109 Therefore Addax Music, a copyright holding company, was subject to the imposition of a New York franchise tax on business corporations. 110 The Addax Music case did not advance any further and has since remained an obscure administrative decision. Dec. 14, 1984) . The doctrine of business situs, however, has been applied in much earlier cases that did not involve intellectual property. E.g., Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 213 (1929) (citations of cases omitted) (holding that decedent's bonds and certificates ''had acquired permanent situs for taxation in New York,'' not in the state of owner's domicile, because they had become integral parts of local businesses).
102
The Audit Division issued a Notice of Estimated Deficiency for the tax years from 1971 through 1977 for the franchise taxes due under New York's Tax Law. Addax Music Co., 1984 WL 179619, at *1. The department held a hearing and subsequently decided that Addax Music was subject to the franchise tax on business corporations for the years at issue. Id. at *4.
103
Id. at *1.
104
Id. at *1-*2. ASCAP is the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers. Generally, ASCAP holds the repertory of all the copyrighted works of its members. On behalf of its members, ASCAP grants nonexclusive blanket licenses to users. Id.
105
Id. at *2. ASCAP could not, however, determine from its records how much of a member's royalty for a particular composition is derived from a particular state. Id. It could only ascertain the amount of fees collected from licensees in a particular state, such as New York. Id.
106
Id. at *3. The department stated that ''intangibles . . . have a taxable situs of their own which may be away from the domicile of the owner if they have become integral parts of some local business.'' Id. (citations omitted).
107
Id. The department framed the issue as ''whether the copyrights were an integral part of some local business activity'' of Addax Music. Id. The department affirmatively answered this inquiry. Id.
108
Id. (noting that petitioner through ASCAP licensed use of its copyrighted music and collected its royalties based on user fee distribution formula).
109
Id. at *4 (''[P]etitioner's means of continued efforts in the pursuit of profit and gain as well as the local business into which petitioner's intangibles were, of necessity, integrated'') (internal punctuation omitted). In Geoffrey, Toys ''R'' Us Inc. created Geoffrey Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary, in Delaware. 113 Geoffrey owned all trademarks and know-how and licensed that intellectual property to the parent company in exchange for royalty payments. 114 In 1985 Toys ''R'' Us began doing business in South Carolina and since then had made royalty payments to Geoffrey based on South Carolina sales. 115 The South Carolina Supreme Court applied the business situs theory to the intellectual property licensed for use in South Carolina and found that the intellectual property was located in South Carolina. 116 That subjected Geoffrey, the intellectual property holder, to South Carolina taxation. 117 The court rejected Geoffrey's argument that its intellectual property assets were held at its corporate headquarters in Delaware, not in South Carolina. 118 Without analysis, the court summarily ruled that the constitutional requirement of substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause 119 was established because the intellectual property was present through the licensing arrangement, and the royalty income was derived from that license. 120 Further Id. (describing transactions between Geoffrey and parent company concerning trademarks and trade names). The parent company transferred all trademarks and trade names to Geoffrey, and Geoffrey granted an exclusive license to the parent company to use the trademarks and trade names in the United States, except New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. Id. In addition, Geoffrey granted an exclusive right to the parent company to use Geoffrey's know-how in connection with the advertising, marketing, and sales of products associated with the trademarks. Id. at 17. Geoffrey, in exchange for the license grant, received 1 percent of the net sales by the parent company or its affiliates or subsidiaries. Id. The royalty payments were transferred via wire from a Toys ''R'' Us account in Pennsylvania to a Geoffrey account in New York. Id.
115
Id. at 15. Toys ''R'' Us subsequently deducted the royalty payments made to Geoffrey from its South Carolina taxable income. Id. The South Carolina Tax Commission allowed this deduction despite its initial opposition. Id.
116
Id. at 17 (''[I]ntangibles may acquire a situs for taxation other than at the domicile of the owner if they have become integral parts of some local business'') (citations omitted).
117
Id. (finding that ''Geoffrey's purposeful direction of activity toward South Carolina as well as its possessing intangible property here provide a definite link between South Carolina and the income derived by Geoffrey from the use of its trademarks and trade names in this State'').
118
119
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Quill specifically stated that the due process requirement is distinct from the Commerce Clause standard, the South Carolina court took a contrary position, importing its due process analysis into its Commerce Clause analysis. Id. at 18 n.5 (''Further discussion of the remaining requirements of the Commerce Clause is unnecessary. Our Due Process analysis of the benefits conferred upon Geoffrey applied with equal force here and need not be repeated''). Review Board held that IP holding companies were subject to North Carolina taxation because the subsidiaries' trademarks and their associated goodwill were used in North Carolina at numerous retail stores. 125 The subsidiaries were Delaware corporations, holding trademarks previously owned by The Limited and related retail companies. 126 Those same retail companies transferred their trademarks to the IP holding companies and obtained the license rights to use those same trademarks in exchange for royalty fees from the subsidiaries. 127 The Limited and the related retail companies deducted royalty payments from their income for North Carolina. 128 The Tax Review Board found that the subsidiaries' trademarks exist in North Carolina because trademarks are the kind of property that ''exist[s] only where it is used.'' 129 Further, the use of trademarks permanently affixed to retail locations and appearing on the labels of merchandise sold at such stores renders the marks in use each time employees at the locations sell the merchandise. 130 Therefore, such use of the trademarks occurs in North Carolina and preserves the existence of the subsidiaries' trademarks. Accordingly, the IP holding companies are subject to North Carolina taxation. 131
Categorically assigning intellectual property like patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks a business situs wherever the products associated with such intellectual property rights are offered for sale is overreaching.
These court and administrative decisions illustrate that the business situs theory has been revived by local taxing authorities to extend the state's taxing power to reach out-of-state IP holding companies. 132 The decisions reflect a desperate attempt by local taxing authorities to address the need to raise revenue in the post-Quill era since the Quill Court mandated a bright-line approach to state taxation wherein the physical presence of a foreign company in the taxing jurisdiction is required. 133 The Id. at 11,056 (adopting the assistant secretary's reasoning).
[P]rinciples of trademark law . . . property cannot exist apart from an established business in which it is used; if the property is not used, the property is considered abandoned and ceases to exist. The Taxpayers' property therefore exists only where it is used. The Taxpayers' property is used extensively in North Carolina in connection with established businesses. These established businesses are the 130 plus North Carolina retail locations of the Taxpayers' related retail companies. Id.
130
131
Id. (affirming findings by the assistant secretary that IP holding companies own ''income-producing property in North Carolina'' and license ''income-producing property in North Carolina,'' and therefore, IP holding companies were ''doing business '' under leads to adoption of the business situs theory wherein the presence of intellectual property is sufficient to justify the substantial nexus between the taxing jurisdiction and the foreign IP holding company. 134
B. Problems With Business Situs For Intellectual Property
A state's desire to reach royalty payments received by foreign IP holding companies is understandable, since foreign IP holding companies are not subject to any state taxation because their royalty payments are ''nowhere'' income. 135 They enjoy state-tax-free status due to the resultant shifting of intellectual property asset ownership within the corporate structure. The ''nowhere'' income has become a frustration to states futilely trying to extend their reach to tax such income. 136 However, categorically assigning intellectual property like patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks a business situs wherever the products associated with such intellectual property rights are offered for sale 137 is overreaching.
Indeed, under the business situs theory, national book authors have much to fear from a state's taxation reach. For example, John Grisham, a national author of legal thrillers, has his books sold in major bookstores across the United States. 138 In order for the legitimate sale of his books to occur, both the John Grisham name and the associated bundle of copyrights -such as derivative, reproduction, distribution, public display, and performance rights 139 -have already been the subject of a license arrangement between the book publisher and the author. 140 Like many national authors, Grisham has appeared on book tours to promote his novels. 141 Thus, he may be deemed actively involved at the macro level in the local business of selling books. Book authors generally receive their royalty payments based on the number of copies sold. 142 National authors most likely receive their income from royalty payments, whether in the form of an advance, lump sum, or periodic installments. 
135
The frustration with ''nowhere'' income has been forcefully expressed in a dissenting opinion in Acme Royalty Co. v Id. at 79-80 (Wolff, J., dissenting) (asserting that ''intellectual properties, the patent and trademark rights, are part of the products that are sold,'' and thus holders of such intellectual property benefit from the state where the products are sold, and that benefit should subject such holders to state income taxation); see also GAP, 886 So. 2d Copyright law grants the author ownership of a copyright, as well as the exclusive rights due and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; [and] (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly. 17 U.S.C. section 106 (2000) .
140
The arrangement between publishers and authors was noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 175 n.43 (1985) (noting the usual practice in the publishing industry that ''book authors usually contract with book publishers for the publication of their works, the publisher taking title to all rights in the work subject to the provisions of the contract'') (citation omitted).
141
Grisham signed books at independent bookstores before he became an internationally known author. See Bob Summer, ''Grisham's Southern Loyalists, '' Publishers Weekly, Mar. 3, 2003 (noting Grisham's return to five independent bookstores for signings), available at http://www.keepmedia.com/ ShowItemDetails.do?itemID=119968&extID=10032&oliID=213 (last visited February 18, 2005) .
142
Mills Music Inc., 469 U.S. at 175 n.43 (''The author usually receives a royalty computed as a percentage of the price at which each book is sold or as a percentage of the total volume of sales'') (citation omitted).
143
See Comm 'r v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 385 n.8 (1949) (noting for tax purposes ''that a payment in the nature of a rent or royalty is in a lump sum rather than so much per annum, per unit of property, per performance, per book sold, Since the copyrights and author's name are integral to the business of selling books at the local level, state taxing authorities would argue that Grisham's intellectual property has acquired business situs in each state where the books are sold. 144 Therefore, according to the business situs rule, a state may tax Grisham on the royalty income that he receives from his publisher. Grisham potentially faces such taxation in all states, except those few states that do not impose a tax on royalty income, such as Michigan and Delaware. That certainly leads to multiple taxation problems as well as an administrative impossibility for authors as taxpayers. 145 Moreover, copyrights and other intellectual property do not exist in perpetuity, and Grisham's intellectual property rights in connection with his books may expire before all the physical copies of the books are sold. 146 That means Grisham may still receive royalty payments for the books in print while his intellectual property rights have already terminated. 147 Could states continue to assert that there is a substantial nexus between the state and Grisham, even though Grisham's intellectual property rights no longer exist? The link between Grisham and the state vis-à-vis the intellectual property rights previously used in the sale of Grisham's books at various locations within a state vanishes, as there are no longer intangible rights to form the business situs.
Constitutionally, the business situs theory has additional problems. Courts applying and commentators advocating the business situs rule often prematurely limit the business situs to the due process analysis. 148 They ignore the Commerce Clause nexus analysis. 149 This is in direct conflict with the established requirement that states may impose taxation to the extent constitutionally permissible, which ensures that both due process and Commerce Clause requirements are satisfied. 150 Since the Quill Court interpreted the Commerce Clause to require tangible property or physical presence within a state for the establishment of a substantial nexus, 151 using the business situs of intellectual property as the required link between a state and the foreign holder of intellectual property rights cannot withstand constitutional muster. 152 or a certain percentage of the receipts or profits, does not alter the character of the payment as rent or royalty'') (citations omitted).
144
See Acme Royalty Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72, 72 (Mo. 2002) E.g., Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16-17 (analyzing business situs of intellectual property under due process and finding that ''Geoffrey's purposeful direction of activity toward South Carolina as well as its possessing intangible property here provide a definite link between South Carolina and the income derived by Geoffrey from the use of its trademarks and trade names in this State'').
149
See Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 210 (noting that cases that applied business situs rule focused only on due process analysis). The Lanco court said that such case authorities failed to lend support to the assertion that the ''Commerce Clause nexus may be found absent physical presence ascribable to a taxpayer.'' Id. at 212. 
151
See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (noting that the Court, on several occasions, has affirmed a sharp distinction between mail-order sellers with physical presence in taxing the state and those who do no more than communicate with customers in state by mail or common carrier as part of general interstate business). The Court has also expressed '' 'doubt that termination of an interstate telephone call, by itself, provides a substantial enough nexus for a State to tax a call.' '' Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989) ).
152
The Quill Court adopted a bright-line approach in imposing the physical presence test for sales and use tax because such an approach ''encourages settled expectations and, in doing so, fosters investment by businesses and individuals.'' Id. at 316. The Court said Congress adopted a similar approach for state taxation of net income. Id. at 316 n.9. (''It is worth noting that Congress has, at least on one occasion, followed a similar approach in its regulation of state taxation . . . . Congress enacted Pub. L. 86-272, codified at 15 U.S.C. section 381[, which forbids states from imposing] a net income tax on any person if that person's 'only business In addition, the business situs theory is incongruous, as illustrated in the next hypothetical. Imagine that Grisham decides to offer a few autographed copies of his books for sale via telephone. Now, Grisham has become a remote seller of those limited copies. Under the Quill mandate, a state cannot impose sales or use taxes on Grisham -the remote seller -due to the lack of a substantial nexus between the state and Grisham. If there is no substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause for sales and use taxes, how could a substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause be present for state income taxes? It would be incongruous to assert that there is nevertheless a substantial nexus between the state and Grisham for state taxation of royalty payments that Grisham receives based on the volume of his books sold at retailers across the state and yet no substantial nexus between the state and Grisham for sales or use taxes. 153
VI. Balancing Interests in Holding Intellectual Property
As intellectual property assets continue to be valuable corporate assets, holders of such assets will seek ways to legitimately minimize tax burdens in their quest to maximize overall corporate revenue and profit. 154 States that want to extend their taxing power to reach IP holding companies should first have some understanding of the nature of intellectual property rights. 155 Sound tax policies require considering the interests of intellectual property rights holders and then balancing those interests with local taxation.
A. Corporeal Nature of Intellectual Property, Infringements, and Remedies
Intellectual property is a peculiar form of intangible property. 156 One cannot touch and feel a trademark, copyright, trade secret, or patent, and yet those things seem to be everywhere. 157 A trademark affixed to a tangible product is present wherever the product is shipped, offered for sale, and consumed. 158 A copyright is intangible, yet has a presence wherever a tangible copy of the copyrighted work is transported and used. 159 A trade secret or a patent is embodied in the tangible, movable, and physical machinery, process, product, or method. 160 Where is the situs of a trademark, copyright, trade secret, or patent? According to trade secret law, trade secrets have a fictional situs where the Prods. Inc. v. State, No. F. 94-444, 1995 WL 800114, at *3 (Ala. Dep't Rev. Dec. 11, 1995 . (''If the Taxpayer does not have sufficient nexus with Alabama for sales and use tax purposes, which it clearly does not have under Quill, then it is incongruous that the Taxpayer would have 'substantial nexus' to be subject to Alabama's franchise tax.'') 154 See Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 219 (noting that ''perhaps the decisive reason . . . for placing ownership of intangibles in a separate corporation . . . is the avoidance of taxation'').
155
The intellectual property rights holder understands its valuable intellectual property assets and the intangible nature of the rights embodied in the physical copies. Furthermore, the intellectual property rights holder will search different jurisdictions for favorable taxation results before conducting its business. That leaves the taxing authority ''bound where the taxpayer has chosen shrewdly.'' Id. The copyright of a work of authorship is present in the sense that the copyright is fixed in the tangible object, such as a book or a CD ROM. See Advent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that computer program may be copyrightable as intangible intellectual property, but once it is copied onto floppy disk it becomes tangible physical good); Tyler T. Ochoa, ''Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form(Gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter? '' 20 Santa Clara Comp. & H. Tech. L.J. 991, 995-996 (2004) (stating that copyright law separates work of authorship -an intangible intellectual creation in which copyright subsists -from tangible object in which work is fixed). In infringement jurisprudence, however, the situs of the injury in patent infringement actions is the location, or locations, where the infringing activity directly impacts the interests of the patentee. 169 That is so because the ''[e]conomic loss occurs to the patent holder at the place where the infringing sale is made because the patent owner loses business there.'' 170 Likewise, in trademark and copyright infringement cases, the situs of the infringement is the place where the infringing sales are made. 171 Because the focus in infringement actions is on longarm jurisdiction over the defendant, neither a plaintiff's residence nor a plaintiff's contacts with the forum state are considered determinative factors. Therefore, the fictional presence of intellectual property does not have any jurisdictional significance in a long-arm jurisdictional analysis. 172 The focus instead is on the place of the infringing harm and on the conduct of the defendants. '' 14 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 327, 336 (2004) . Since the federal protection for trademarks is significantly broader than state protections, most trademark owners today seek federal protection for their trademarks. See id. (noting benefits provided federally registered trademark); Danielle Conway-Jones, ''Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an Accounting of Defendant's Profits, '' 42 Santa Clara L. Rev. 863, 866-873 (2002) (discussing expansion of federal trademark protection); Lisa P. Ramsey, ''Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, '' 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 1095 , 1124 (discussing several benefits provided under federal law). '' 14 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 369, 396-397 (2004) (discussing the source of copyright law and its purpose).
166
See Harry Miller Co., 5 F. Supp. 21 at 298 n.1 (distinguishing patents, copyrights, and trademarks from trade secrets).
167
Educ. Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 631 F. Supp. 550, 564 (D.N.J. 1986) (''[B] ecause both patents and trade secrets would be deemed to have fictional situs at the residence of their owners, the cause of action arose in the plaintiff's home state''); London Film Prods. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47, 49 n.4 (D.N.J. 1984 Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558 , 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994 ) (rejecting a previous decision holding that situs of patent infringement injury is situs of intangible property interest, that is, where owner resides).
169
Id. at 1571.
170
Id. The court determined that the best method for defining the legal situs of an injury under patent law was to locate the place of sale of the infringing good. Id. The court reasoned:
Analysis of long-arm jurisdiction has its focus on the conduct of the defendant. Plaintiff's contacts with the forum -such as where the plaintiff resides -as a general proposition are not considered a determinative consideration. Additionally, a focus on the place where the infringing sales are made is consistent with other areas of intellectual property law -it brings patent infringement actions into line with the rule applied in trademark and copyright cases. Id. (footnotes omitted).
171
Id. at 1572.
172
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted, however, that ''intangible property has no actual situs,'' and that the fictional presence accorded such property by law ''can have no jurisdictional significance.' ' Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980) . Accordingly, a holder of a trademark, copyright, or patent may bring an infringement action against potential defendants in any federal district court where the infringing conduct occurs as long as the federal district court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the forum state's long-arm jurisdiction. 174 A successful claimant then can enjoy the remedies available, thereby enjoining the infringing conduct nationwide. 175 From the infringement and remedies perspective, intellectual property rights seem to be everywhere. Intellectual property rights holders seem to benefit from every state where the products and services associated with the rights reside.
Does it then follow that every state can tax one of the benefits, such as income derived from intellectual property rights, because the situs for infringement of intellectual property rights seems to reside in any state where the infringing conduct occurs? 176 The answer is a resounding no. The jurisdictional focus in an infringement action involving intellectual property is the connection between the infringing defendant and the forum -not the physical, substantial nexus between the intellectual property holder and the forum. Further, the in personam jurisdictional inquiry is a due process analysis, not a Commerce Clause inquiry. 177 Thus, whether a particular forum has jurisdiction over an infringer may not establish that the forum also has a substantial nexus with the intellectual property owner. 178 Therefore, the fact that an out-of-state holder of intellectual property can petition the courts sitting in a particular state to protect its intellectual property rights in infringement cases does not mean that the state has a substantial nexus with the holder for state tax purposes. 179
B. Holding Intellectual Property Or a Quest for Tax Avoidance?
Companies with large intellectual property assets in their portfolios have business as well as tax the conduct of the defendant. A plaintiff's contacts with the forum, such as where the plaintiff resides, as a general proposition are not considered a determinative consideration. Id. at 1571-72. 174 See N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales Inc., 35 F.3d 1576 , 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994 ) (holding that the situs of patent infringement occurs where offending act is committed). In trademark infringement actions, two circuits have stated that the claim arises at the place of the ''passing off,'' which is ''where the deceived customer buys the defendant's product in the belief that he is buying the plaintiff's. '' Tefal, S.A. v. Prods. Int'l Co., 529 F.2d 495, 496 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976 This argument was advanced by the dissenting opinion in Acme Royalty Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Mo. 2002) . (''Missouri not only creates a marketplace for these products, including their licenses, but also affords legal protections to these 'taxpayers.' For instance if a company were to sell 'Gore-Tex' products or 'Acme' bricks in Missouri without licenses from these 'taxpayers,' there is no doubt that these 'taxpayers' could use Missouri courts to enforce their rights to the intellectual property. '') 182 The corporation with such control gains knowledge about the current value of its intellectual property assets, can decide which direction it should chart with those assets, may expand its market through licensing certain intellectual property rights, and may develop new alliances or partnerships by using its intellectual property assets in joint-venture or cobranding arrangements. 183 With centralized management of intellectual property assets, the corporation has the information necessary to decide whether it should increase holdings in a certain area of intellectual property rights. It also understands which intellectual property assets are valuable and subsequently invests or divests in certain intellectual property assets over others. 184 Moreover, the centralized management of intellectual property assets provides a platform for comprehensive monitoring, protection, and enforcement of intellectual property rights. 185 This minimizes the risks of having those rights expire due to administrative errors, such as failing to renew intellectual property registrations or paying fees to appropriate governmental agencies. Also, it allows the corporation to initiate timely and appropriate action to deter the infringement of intellectual property assets and prevent losses of certain intellectual property rights through abandonment or through genericide via unpoliced use by a third party. 186 Further, the IP holding company has control over royalty payments and discretion to invest them for future earnings and significant additional income. 187 These business reasons should not be disregarded by states that think all IP holding companies are formed solely for tax avoidance purposes.
Even if the formation of an IP holding company is for tax avoidance purposes, such goals are not illegal. 188 Utilizing legitimate means to minimize taxation is the prerogative of any entity that is doing business and facing competition in the marketplace. 189 As long as there are jurisdictions that do not tax royalty income, individuals or corporations will form wholly owned subsidiary companies to hold intellectual property assets in such jurisdictions. As long as there are nonuniform tax laws and regulations among the states, the search for a better jurisdiction to minimize the state tax burden will continue. Each state has its own power to decide how it can reach the royalty income received by IP holding companies, as long as that reach is within constitutional confines. 190 
180
See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504, 510 (Mass. 2002) (holding that the evidence supported conclusion that transfer and license-back of intellectual property between parent and wholly owned subsidiary were for economic substance and business purposes).
181
Id. at 517 (assessing transactions between parent and subsidiary in the broader context of the operation of resultant businesses and concluding that transfer and licensing-back of trademarks were for substantial reasons beyond tax benefits).
182
Id. at 518 (noting that the establishment of IP holding companies to hold various trademarks have ''legal, practical, and economic effects'' on the parent company as well as result in ''new, viable business enterprises'').
183
See id. at 518 (noting that IP holding companies with exclusive control of intellectual property had the power to license assets to parent company and third-party companies).
184
See id. (stating that IP holding companies assumed and paid expenses of maintaining and defending their trademark assets).
185
See id. at 517 (stating that IP holding companies ''incurred and paid the substantial liabilities to unrelated third parties and [the parent company] to maintain, manage, and defend the marks'').
186
See id. (noting that ''[l]egal title and physical possession of the marks passed from Sherwin-Williams to the subsidiaries, as did the benefits and burdens of owning the marks'').
187
See id. at 513 (stating that revenue earned by IP holding companies, including proceeds from royalty payments made by parent company, ''was not returned to [the the parent company] as a dividend but, rather, was retained and invested as part of their ongoing business operations, earning significant additional income'').
188
Id. at 513-514 (''There is no rule against taking advantage of opportunities created by [the Legislature or revenue service] for beating taxes''; quoting Yosha v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 861 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1988) ). Further, the transfer and license-back transaction ''does not lose its [tax] immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one chooses, evade, taxation. '' Id. at 514. 189 Therefore, the subjective motives that a business entity possesses when it creates an IP holding company do not serve as a basis for disregarding the transaction because the ''tax system is a rule-based system, objective in nature, that places principal importance on what taxpayers do and the economic consequences attached to those actions, not on what may have subjectively motivated them to act in the first place.'' Id. Indeed, the court explained:
[The parent company], on initially going into business, could have organized itself in such a way that its intangible assets (e.g., its marks) were held in a corporation separate from the corporations holding its production facilities and sales operations; the corporation owning the marks could have licensed those marks to its sister corporations; and this arrangement would have been respected by taxing authorities even if the structure were motivated entirely by a desire to minimize [the parent company's] over-all tax burdens. Although motivated by tax considerations, such a structure would not have been an uncommon way of doing business nor an artificial construct whose only possible effect was the avoidance of taxes.
Id.

190
See Christina R. Edson, ''Quill's Constitutional Jurisprudence and Tax Nexus Standards in an Age of Electronic Commerce, '' 49 Tax Law. 893, 895 (1996) Instead of zealously pursuing IP holding companies and encountering myriad problems, states may consider different approaches that could strike a balance between the states' interests and those of intellectual property rights holders. For example, instead of seeking out IP holding companies, states should determine whether to allow in-state operating companies that use the intellectual property rights under the license arrangement to deduct the royalty amounts paid to IP holding companies. 191 If there is no direct relationship, such as parentsubsidiary, between the operating company and the IP holding company, the deduction is permissible because the license arrangement is for business reasons as long as the rate is at arm's length. 192 If the arrangement between the IP holding company and the operating company is a sham because it lacks business and economic substance, the deduction is impermissible. 193 Evidence of a sham arrangement may include the parent company holding majority control of the stock in an IP holding company, the relatively unchanged status of the intellectual property rights management and control before and after the transfer and license-back relationship, and the lack of a coherent business purpose behind the establishment of the IP holding company. 194 Furthermore, instead of the deduction allowance approach, states may require combined reporting by all corporate components of an enterprise engaged in a unitary business conducted in part within the taxing state. 195 Under the combined reporting approach, states must establish that there is a unitary business between the parent company and its subsidiaries, including the IP holding company. 196 The taxing authority reaches the apportioned royalty income by directing its attention to the operating company within the state. This is possible because the transactions between the operating company and the IP holding company should not be acknowledged since they have no economic substance, serve no legitimate business purpose, fail to reflect an taxing power is limited by the Due Process Clause and interstate commerce concerns under the Commerce Clause).
191
This approach requires a fact-intensive inquiry as employed by a few jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts. See Syms Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 765 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Mass. 2002) (stating that whether creation of an IP holding company and transfer and license-back arrangement constitutes sham is primarily factual inquiry, in which taxpayer bears burden of proof in abatement process).
192
See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 778 N.E.2d 504, 504 (Mass. 2002) (allowing deduction of royalty payments by parent company to IP holding company); Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 760 (denying deduction under sham transaction doctrine and ''ordinary and necessary expenses'' doctrine); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. section 54:10A-4.4 (West 2002) (disallowing deductions for royalty payments made to related entity for use of intangible property).
193
See Syms, 765 N.E.2d at 760 (affirming the board's denial of deduction of royalty payments made by parent company because royalty payments were not an ordinary and necessary business expense). The court in Syms adopted the board's findings that:
[T]he value of the marks had been created entirely by 
194
See id. at 762 (noting that business operations of parent corporation did not change after transfer and license-back of marks to IP holding company when parent company continued to maintain and protect goodwill and value of trademarks, paid for all attorney fees associated with protection and enforcement of trademarks along with advertising expenditures, continued to choose which products would be sold under marks, and oversaw quality control of those products).
195
arm's-length charge, and were formed solely as a means to avoid taxation. 197 It is time for a bright-line rule in this pressing area of the law.
In the proposed approaches, though the taxing authority does not directly pursue the out-of-state IP holding company, the result is the same: Apportioned royalty income is subject to state taxation. 198 Those approaches, however, limit a state's reach to royalty income when the relationship between the operating company and the IP holding company is not a sham. 199 States cannot tax the royalty income when the IP holding company is a legitimately separate business entity. 200
VII. Conclusion
Intellectual property will continue to enjoy its status as a valuable corporate asset in the economy. As enormous amounts of financial resources are devoted to the creation, protection, and enforcement of trademarks, copyrights, patents, and trade secrets, holders of such property will continue to look for ways to maximize the return from their valuable intellectual property. Many holders of such property have successfully devised and utilized the IP holding company model as a means of avoiding state taxation. Some state taxing authorities have desperately attempted to reach the handsome royalty ''nowhere'' income. As long as the ambiguity caused by Quill, the lack of response from Congress, 201 Treasury v. Syl Inc., 825 A.2d 399, 401 (Md. 2003 ) (affirming comptroller's finding that Delaware IP holding company was a phantom company that lacked any economic substance).
201
Even the Quill Court has suggested that Congress, with its commerce power, is the appropriate branch to address state taxation and the burden on interstate commerce. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (inviting Congress to address state taxation power in area involving multistate and interstate commerce because ''Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce from intolerable or even undesirable burdens'').
